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STUDENT COMMENT
FEARLESS FORECASTS: CORPORATE LIABILITY
FOR EARNINGS FORECASTS THAT MISS THE MARK
On February 2, 1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(hereinafter the SEC or the Commission) issued a policy statement
declaring that it had decided "to take the first steps toward" the
inclusion of companies' own earnings forecasts in the SEC's disclo-
sure system.' The question whether the earnings predictions pre-
pared by a company's own personnel should be included in the
reports required to be regularly filed with the SEC or in the registra-
tion statement required for a public issue of securities remains a
controversial issue in the financial community. 2 One of the impor-
tant stumbling blocks to a more extensive publication of forecasts is
the fear of businessmen and their counsel that companies may be
exposed to civil liability in the event that forecasts miss the mark.
This comment will begin with a brief review of the controversy over
public earnings forecasts. It will then explore the question of civil
liability for incorrect forecasts, and , will conclude with a suggestion
as to how such forecasts should be viewed by the courts.
I. THE DISCLOSURE SYSTEM AND EARNINGS FORECASTS
In the wake of the stock market debacle of 1929, Congress
passed a series of laws designed to regulate the issuing and trading
of securities. 3 The hallmark of the federal regulatory system is
"disclosure," that is, the idea that the best method of protecting the
investor is to require that those who issue or trade in securities
disclose enough information to allow the investor to make an in-
formed decision." Under the Securities Act of 1933, 5 when securities
' SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5362, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9984 (Feb.
2, 1973) (Statement by the Commission on the Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance) [hereinafter SEC Statement].
2 However, some of the companies that began publishing their forecasts in the wake of
the SEC announcement have since soured on the idea, primarily because of the difficulty of
making accurate forecasts in the current unsettled economic conditions. See Annual Reports;
The Forecasting Fad is Over, Bus. Week, July 27, 1974, at 60.
3 'The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970); the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970); The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb
(1970); The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-52 (1970); and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-21 (1970).
4 The preamble to the Securities Act of 1933 states that its purpose is; "To provide full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof . . ." 48 Stat. 74 (1933). The
SEC has emphasized that its function is not to pass on the merits of an offering, but merely to
ensure that the investor has sufficient information to make a decision.
Under the [1933] Act, speculative or apparently unsound issues can be registered and
sold provided the whole truth is told. . The basic policy is not to attempt to
protect the investor by insulating him from risk but to make available to him the
information with which to gauge the risk.
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covered by the Act are sold to the public, a registration statement
must be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission contain-
ing an extensive amount of information about the company and
about the security to be offered, and much of this information must
also be included in a prospectus designed to inform investors about
the offering. 6
 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 7 com-
panies whose shares are publicly held must participate in a program
of continuous information disclosure that includes periodic reports
filed with the Commission. 8
One item of information that has not been a part of the disclo-
sure requirements is a company's own forecasts of its future earn-
ings. Of course, an investor is vitally interested in the prospects of a
company in which he may invest, and sellers of securities are eager
to tempt the buyer with projections of future profits. Nevertheless,
it has been the policy of the SEC that such forecasts should not be a
part of the disclosure system. In early "stop order" actions against
new issues, the Commission seemed to take a tolerant view of the
inclusion of reasonable projections of future performance in registra-
tion statements, 9 but opposed predictions that gave the appearance
of being more certain than they actually were.'° Thereafter, how-
SEC Tenth Ann. Rep. 15 (1945). See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of
1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29, 34 (1959); 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, 127-28 (1961).
See also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 563 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
5
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
6
 Section 7 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970), sets out the required contents of a
registration statement, and § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970), describes the contents of a prospec-
tus.
7
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970).
8
 Section 13 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. * 78m (1970), sets forth the requirements for
periodic filings with the Commission. For an argument that the continuous disclosure of the
Securities Exchange Act should be the basis of a new regulatory system replacing the dual
provisions of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, see Cohen, "Truth in
Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340 (1966).
9
 See, e:g., American Kid Co., 1 S.E.C. 694 (1936), where the Commission issued a stop
order after finding that an estimate of future annual net profits contained in a registration
statement was "so grossly exaggerated as to constitute a misrepresentation." The Commission
went on to say:
While we recognize that, in estimating profits for new enterprises, registrants cannot
be held to too strict a standard and that some degree of tolerance may be permitted,
nevertheless the fact that this registrant's estimated profits are out of line with those
of established experienced concerns in the same business is misleading in the absence
of supporting data which would substantiate this unusual estimate.
Id. at 698.
In another stop-order proceeding, Ypres Cadillac Mines Ltd. (No Personal Liability), 3
S.E.C. 41 (1938), the Commission found no fault with a registration statement containing an
estimate of the future selling price of the shares. The Commission said:
An estimate can not be used, of course, which is lacking in any foundation, but this
is not the situation in the instant case as the record shows. While the estimate was
based upon optimistic assumptions, we cannot find that it involved a misrepresenta-
tion of its bases. Accordingly we do not find the answer to this item to be deficient.
Id. at 52.
'° Comstock-Dexter Mines, Inc., to S.E.C. 358, 372 (1941) (estimate of extent of gold
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ever, the Commission developed the policy that predictions of future
performance were out of place in a prospectus or registration
statement.'i Underlying this policy are the beliefs that projections
are inherently unreliable, that there is a danger of abuse by stock
market manipulators, that the unsophisticated investor would give
undue credence to projections, and that projections are not "facts"
and therefore do not fit within the factual disclosure system. 12 It
was believed that, given the requisite amount of information about
a company's past and present situation, an investor could make his
own predictions that would probably be as valid as those of man-
agement or investment analysts."
Thus, predictions are barred from registration statements and
prospectuses attending new issues. They are likewise barred from
the continuous disclosure process set up by the Securities Exchange
Act." In addition, companies that are in the process of issuing new
securities are strongly discouraged from making predictions in pub-
lic statements, because the Commission has taken the position that
any such public prediction might be interpreted as an "offer to sell"
forthcoming securities before the registration statement becomes
effective, which constitutes a violation of the Securities Act of
1933." As a result, companies that are "in registration" do not issue
predictions about their future performance.' 6
ore included as a fixed asset on the balance sheet); Thomas Bond, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 60 (1939)
(profit possibilities of a new cosmetic company in exact percentage "lend[s] an appearance of
predictability of future profits which is improper for a corporation which has yet to start
business." Id. at 71).
" The elimination of forecasts from registration statements and prospectuses was ac-
complished through informal administrative action; companies know they must not include
them in order to avoid a stop-order proceeding. A report on disclosure prepared by SEC staff
members and submitted to the Commission in 1969 noted that "lilt has been the Commission's
long-standing policy not to permit projections and predictions in prospectuses and reports filed
with the Commission." SEC, Disclosure to Investors, A Reappraisal of Federal Administra-
tive Policies under the '33 and '34 Acts 96 (1969) he re i nafter cited as The Wheat Report).
22 The authors of The Wheat Report, supra note 11, argued: "A real danger exists, in the
Study's judgment, that projections appearing in prospectuses and other documents filed under
the securities laws and reviewed by the commission would be accorded a greater measure of
validity by the unsophisticated than they would deserve." The Wheat Report, supra note 11,
at 96. See also Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus,
Law. 300 (1961). Mr. Heller, a former assistant director of the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance, noted that attempts by companies to predict future earnings on their own or on the
authority of experts have almost invariably been held by the Commission to be misleading
because they suggest to the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not exist,
and he concluded that "the Securities Act, like the hero of 'Dragnet,' is interested exclusively
in facts." Id. at 307.
13 See The Wheat Report, supra note 11, at 96; Helier, supra note 12, at 307.
' 4 The Wheat Report, supra note 11, at 96. See also Schneider, Nits, Grits and Soft
Information in SEC filings, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 254, 257-58 (1972).
25 SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5180 (August 16, 1971) (Guidelines for the Release of
Information by Issuers whose Securities are in Registration) states that "any publication of
information by a company in registration other than by means of a statutory prospectus
should be limited to factual information and should not include such things as predictions,
projections, forecasts or opinions with respect to value."
lb The American system of discouraging disclosure of management's projections for the
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Although banned from required disclosure, and also from pub-
lic dissemination while a company is "in registration," predictions
apparently form a significant part of the corporate information that
is communicated to the public. A 1966 survey disclosed that be-
tween one-fourth and one-third of all widely held companies were
issuing earnings projections to the financial press." In addition,
about one-third of the companies surveyed actively contacted se-
curities analysts to discuss the company's prospects, and virtually all
said they would respond to unsolicited inquiries from analysts deal-
ing with projections. 18
 Some companies have included projected
earnings in their annual reports," but most companies that make
public their projections do not send them to shareholders. 2 °
Recently sentiment has been growing among some members of
the financial community in favor of an end to the SEC's opposition
to publication of earnings forecasts. 21 The arguments for increased
dissemination of forecasts are both theoretical and practical. The
theory is that since a forecast of future economic performance is the
most fundamental piece of information bearing on the decision to
invest, the investor would be greatly aided in his decision if he had
access to the forecasts prepared by the management of the company.
future contrasts with the system that has developed in Great Britain. The object of the British
regulatory framework has been said to be identical to that of its American counterpart: "to
ensure that full disclosure is made of all information needed to enable a potential investor to
assess the worth of the securities." L. Gower, Modern Company Law 291 (3rd Ed. 1969).
Under the British system, as described by one commentator, companies that are listed on the
London Stock Exchange, or which are seeking to be listed, must include in a prospectus a
statement of the company's prospects. Such forecasts are also encouraged, though not re-
quired, when a company is involved in a merger or takeover bid. As a general rule, earnings
forecasts are made for the remainder of a fiscal year; they sometimes cover longer periods, but
generally the maximum period covered does not exceed 18 months. The predictions are
certified by outside accountants, who check to see that proper accounting procedures have
been followed. In practice such projections are only made by established companies (new
issues do not come under the prospectus requirement) and the accountants would not certify a
forecast of a new company without a history of earnings and forecast preparation. However,
there are significant differences between the British and American securities markets that
make any direct comparison difficult. These include the fact that there is nothing in Britain
comparable to the over-the-counter market in the United States; thus the stock exchanges,
and the London Stock Exchange in particular, play a much more important part in market
regulation than do their American counterparts. There is also a much less litigious climate in
Britain as to prospectus contents. Carmichael, Reporting on Forecasts: a U. K. Perspective,
J. of Accountancy, Jan. 1973, at 37.
1.1 Burson-Marsteller Associates, Patterns in Corporate Disclosure (1966), cited in 2 A.
Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 1013-5 § 7.2(1), at 148.
1 ' Id.
" See Shank & Calfee, Case of the Fuqua Forecast, 51 Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec.
1973, at 34.
2° Bromberg, supra note 17, § 7.2(1), at 148.
21 See, e.g., Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. Law. 631 (1972);
Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or just Unread? - A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against
Permitting Projections, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 222 (1971); Reiling & Burton, Financial
Statements: Signposts as well as Milestones, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 45;
Comment, 21 U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 242 (1973) (arguing that disclosure of internal forecasts should
be required in all but the most extreme situations of unreliability).
118
FEARLESS FORECASTS
Increased publication of forecasts is urged on the premise that the
traditional prospectus, with its often complex financial statements
and impenetrable jargon, has not been an aid to the average inves-
tor. It is argued that forecasts would help the average investor to
make an educated decision, and also aid the sophisticated investor
or stock market analyst, who could compare the figures prepared by
management with his own predictions of a company's prospects. 22
The practical argument in favor of public disclosure of projec-
tions is that since such projections are already available to some
stock-market experts—bankers and those investments analysts who
have an inside track to the management of many corporations
—such information should be available to the ordinary investor as
wel1. 23 Judicial recognition that a company's earnings forecasts may
be so important to the investment decision that they constitute
"inside information" requiring disclosure 24 has added impetus to the
call for public release of all earnings forecasts.
In response to this new recognition of the importance of com-
pany forecasts to the investment decision, the SEC held hearings on
the forecast question late in 1972, 25 and issued its statement shortly
afterwards. 26 The Commission said that it had determined to "take
the first steps" toward the integration of projections into disclosure,
but would not require any company to issue projections. Instead the
Commission announced it would permit companies that met certain
requirements (including a history of earnings and internal budget-
ing) to include projections in registration statements and other re-
22 See generally Mann, supra note 21. In Mann's view, the bar against projections has
two detrimental effects: (I) it reduces the utility of prospectuses as an aid in making invest-
ment decisions, and (2) it reduces the flow of information to investors and investment
intermediaries while a registration statement is pending. He concludes:
Projections prepared by the issuer, reviewed by counsel familiar with the liabilities
provisions of the Securities Act, scrutinized by the staff of the Commission and
accompanied by a full statement of the assumptions upon which they are based,
should be accorded a greater measure of validity than oral projections made by a
securities salesman trying to earn a commission.
40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 231.
23 See Comment, supra note 21, at 246-47.
24 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2ci 228 (2d
Cir. 1974). See also SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., [1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 92,280, at 97342 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Glen Alden the Commission obtained a consent
judgment to block Glen Alden from releasing material information to certain persons in
violation of Rule 10b-5. The persons involved were broker-dealers and investment companies,
and the information included sales, earnings and cash-flow projections.
25 Among those who testified was Wallace E. Olsen, executive vice president of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, who favored a trial period for allowing
projections, but opposed any procedures under which the projections would be vouched for
by outside accountants. This reservation was echoed by Harvey Kapnick, chairman of the
accounting firm of Arthur Andersen & Co., who said that involving outside accountants in
vouching for forecasts, would tend to weaken the accountants' credibility. Among those
opposing the idea of more public forecasting was James J. Needham, the chairman of the
New York Stock Exchange. See the testimony summaries in J. of Accountancy, Jan. 1973, at
9.
26 SEC Statement, supra note 1.
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ports filed with the Commission if the projections were properly
made. Although the statement did not spell out the standards to be
imposed, it did suggest that there would be requirements that a
projection "relate at a minimum to sales and earnings, that it be
expressed in an exact figure or within a reasonable range, that the
underlying assumptions be set forth, and that it be for a reasonable
period, such as a fiscal year." 27
 The Commission also stated that it
was considering rules: (1) requiring that any company that issued a
prediction to anyone outside the company file a copy of the predic-
tion with the Commission; and (2) helping to clear up the problem of
potential liability by setting out the "circumstances under which a
projection would not be considered to be a misleading statement of a
material fact . . . . ),28
II. CIVIL LIABILITY
Perhaps the thorniest problem attending any increased publica-
tion of forecasts is the possibility of civil liability for a prediction
that proves incorrect. Faced with the possibility of devastating
liability under the federal securities laws, many businessmen and
their lawyers argue that the only way that forecasts could systemati-
cally be made public would be under a grant of immunity from the
government. 29
 This comment will now examine potential sources of
liability and evaluate the threat they pose to a large-scale disclosure
program.
Prior to the enactment of the federal securities laws, the remedy
available to an investor claiming he had been swindled in a se-
curities transaction was an action to rescind the sale contract on the
grounds of misrepresentation or fraud, 3° or a suit for damages under
a fraud theory. 3 ' However, these avenues provided little help to
most investors, and even less help to those who had bought stock on
the basis of glowing predictions of future profits and dividends. The
recission remedy was unavailable if the stock had been resold and
was thus unavailable for tendering back. 32 Both recission and dam-
age actions became of even less utility, because of the lack of privity
between the company and the stockholders, when the modern
investment-banking system replaced the 19th-Century system under
which stock was sold directly by the corporation or its agents."
" Id.
28
 Id. At the time this comment was written the Commission had not yet promulgated
the long-awaited rules; its silence suggested that problems raised by projections had been
greater than expected.
" See The Wheat Report, supra note 11, at 95.
" See, e.g., Zeh v. Alameda Community Hotel Corp., 122 Cal. App. 366, 10 P.2d 190
(1932).
31
 See, e.g., Ray County Say. Bank v. Hutton, 224 Mo. 42, 123 S.W. 47 (1909).
32
 See Schulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L.J. 227, 232 (1935); F.
Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 7.10, at 571 (1956).
33
 Schulman, supra note 32, at 239. The transition is described by Judge Medina in
United States Y. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 635-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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The most important problem with both equitable and damage
actions was that they could be maintained only where there had
been a misrepresentation of a "material fact." Predictions were not
ordinarily considered to be facts. 34
 However, an exception was
sometimes made when the forecaster knew that the forecast was
incorrect and could not be achieved. In that case, courts found that
a "material fact," i.e., the state of the forecaster's mind, had been
misrepresented." Some courts refused to find liability even where
the forecasts were made with no expectation of their being fulfilled. 36
In the words of the Supreme Court of Missouri, speaking in 1909:
Frauds, either in civil or criminal law, are not based on
prognostications. Who may know what a day may bring
forth? No man stands condemned in the law because hope
springs in his breast, or because out of the fullness of his
heart his mouth speaketh in.that regard. Therefore the law
does not interdict prophesying the expression of sanguine
business hopes and beliefs in events to come. 37
Thus it appears that the common law liability facing the
businessman who honestly errs in a forecast is minimal. His main
concern is liability under the federal securities laws, which impose
higher anti-fraud standards than does the common law." The most
important provisions for those making forecasts are Rule 10b-5,
promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 39
 which provides a civil remedy for investors injured by
' Sawyer v. Prichett, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 146, 163 (1873); Farwell v. Colonial Trust Co.,
147 F, 480 (8th Cir. 1906); Zeh v. Alameda Community Hotel Corp., 122 Cal. App. 366, 10
P.2d 190 (1932); Earners' Loan and Mortgage Co. v. Langley, 166 La. 251, 117 So. 137 (1928);
Stalnaker v. Jones, 68 W. Va. 176, 69 S.E. 651 (1910).
35 See, e.g., Faust v. Parker, 204 Iowa 297, 213 N.W. 794 (1927); Electric Hammer
Corp. v. Deddens, 206 Ky. 232, 267 S.W. 207 (1924).
See, e.g., Zeh v. Alameda Community Hotel Corp., 122 Cal. App. 366, 10 P.2d 190
(1932).
37
 Ray County Say. Bank v. Hutton, 224 Mo. 42, 64, 123 S.W. 47, 54 (1909).
" See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S, 180, 195 (1963).
39 15 U.S.C.	 78j(b) (1970) as implemented in Rule 106-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1973),
which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Liability might also arise under other provisions of the securities laws, notably H 12(2) and 17
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77q, but these sections are more limited in
scope.
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corporate statements that are untrue or misleading, 4° and section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933, 4 ' which provides a civil remedy for
investors who purchase a new issue when the false or misleading
statement is contained in the registration statement. Thus, the prob-
lem is: how can forecasts of future corporate performance be
evaluated under these provisions?
At least one commentator has expressed the view that since
forecasts are "opinions" rather than "facts," they should not be
included in the SEC's disclosure system since they could not result
in liability and would therefore be capable of abuse. 42
 However, it
is submitted that they can be judged to be "true" or "false" as other
kinds of statements are judged. When considering the question
whether a forecast is "true" or "false" it seems clear that whether the
forecast is realized or not does not determine the answer. For
example a well-prepared forecast that is not achieved because of a
completely unforseeable disaster should not thereby become "false."
The forecast should be judged as of the moment it is made, with
future events important only as evidence of what the situation was
at that moment.
It is submitted that the key to a determination of the truth or
falsity of an earnings forecast, is recognizing that the "truth content"
of a forecast is not that it will come true, but: (1) that the forecast is
made in good faith—sincerely believed by those who make it; and
(2) that it was made after a careful examination of the facts and in
the exercise of prudent judgment—that it was made with due
diligence. 43 This is the "fact" that is represented by a forecast
—publication in good faith and preparation with due diligence. It
therefore follows that whether a prediction comes true does not ipso
facto determine whether it was "true" or "false." The outcome is
merely evidence bearing on the questions whether the forecast was
made in good faith and prepared with due diligence. It also follows
that a "false" forecast can come true—in that case a wrong has been
done, but no harm has resulted.
Thus, under the two most important civil-liability sections of
the securities laws, forecasts can be handled as follows. Section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933 44
 creates a civil action for damages for
investors injured by a registration statement or prospectus that
"contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state
4° See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
41
 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). The section creates a civil action for damages for buyers of an
issue of securities who are injured because the registration statement attending the issue
"contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading." Id.
42
 Heller, supra note 12, at 307 n.18,
43
 Bromberg, supra note 17, suggests that in order to avoid liability, a forecast should
have some combination of three factors: "(1) factual or historical basis, (2) investigation, (3)
sensible method of computation or formation." Bromberg, supra note 17, § 5.3 at 97.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
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a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading , . . "45 Because of the impor-
tance of future earnings to the investment decision, it is likely that
all such forecasts would be found to be "material." Under the above
test of the truth of forecasts, liability of an issuer" would result
either when the forecast was made in bad faith, or when it was not
prepared with due diligence. That is, liability would result
whenever the forecast was "false."
Rule 10b-5 creates an action for damages for false or misleading
statements made in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 47 Under the rule, liability would depend on the approach
the court took to the question of scienter. The circuits are split on
the question, with some courts imposing liability for a misstatement
caused by mere negligence, and others requiring a showing of some
sort of culpable state of mind—scienter. 48 In the former liability for
"false" projections would result in all cases of falsity, whether
caused by bad faith or lack of due diligence. In the latter circuits,
however, liability would only result when the false foredast resulted
from bad faith.
Of course, liability under the language of both Rule 10b-5 and
section 11 can result from statements that are "true" but "mislead-
ing" because of the omission of other material facts. In this regard
projections that are "true" are no different from other "factual"
statements—they can become "misleading" when material facts are
unrevealed, so as to cause the statements made to become "mislead-
ing."
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FORECASTS UNDER
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The few courts that have considered erroneous forecasts under
the federal securities laws have not articulated a definitive test to
determine when liability will result. There are few reported deci-
sions, and even fewer that are final decisions on the merits.
Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co." involved a speech by two direc-
tors at a meeting of the New York Society of Securities Analysts. In
the speech the directors estimated the income and cash flow for that
fiscal year, but underestimated depreciation and depletion. Thus,
49 Id.
46 The issuer has no defense, except the argument that the misstatement did not cause
any injury. Other persons connected with the preparation of the registration statement have
available the "due diligence" defense, under which they can avoid liability if they can show
they did their jobs properly, 15 U.S.C. 5 77k (1970).
47 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir, 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
" The conflict among the federal circuit courts over the question of "scienter" in relation
to Rule 106-5 is reviewed in the recent case of White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 728-36 (9th
Cir, 1974). See also Comment, Lanza v. Drexel & Co. and Rule 10b-5: Approaching the
Scienter Controversy in Private Actions, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 526 (1974).
49 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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when the correct earnings figures were published in the nine-month
report, the price of the stock dropped. Plaintiff stockholders sued
the company and the public relations firm that had distributed
copies of the speech, alleging a violation of Rule 10b-5. The district
court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, noting that the com-
plaint alleged that the misstatements had been made "knowingly
and intentionally with intent to defraud."5 °
Blakely v. Lisac 51 involved an ,action under Rule 10b-5 for
alleged misrepresentations in a prospectus and other statements.
Under the heading of "The Offering and Proceeds" in its prospectus,
the company had included planned expenditures for new equipment
and inventory. The actual expenditures exceeded the prospectus
estimates by nearly 40 percent. The defendants argued that there
was a reasonable basis for the prospectus figures, and, although the
additional expenditures might give rise to an action for a breach of a
fiduciary duty, no action under Rule 10b-5 arose. The district court
judge found the defendants liable for damages, and said:
I reject [defendants'] narrow reading of the rule, and, in
addition, I find that the amounts listed were made without
an adequate basis and created the false impression that
with the $288,000 secured from the public offering, the
company could establish a properly financed nitrogen
freezing business. I believe that 10b-5 is applicable when,
either through undue optimism or negligence, the proposed
spending is underestimated by almost 40 percent in an
offering prospectus."
Although the court's opinion failed to discuss what would have been
an adequate basis for the estimates, it appears that liability was
imposed because of negligence in the preparation of the forecasts,
with the amount of the shortfall the primary evidence of such
negligence.
The leading case on the evaluation of forecasts under Rule
10b-5 is Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 in which an action was brought by
stockholders of the Monsanto Company against the company's prin-
cipal officers and directors. The plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dants had manipulated the stock price to their own advantage by
misleading the investing public. The basis for the allegation was
that certain company officers had sold Monsanto stock while pub-
licly making bullish predictions about the company's future. The
suit was brought under several provisions of the federal securities
laws, including Rule 10b-5. 54 After extensive pre-trial discovery, the
1° Id. at 1377.
5 ' [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Ill 93,788, at 93,415 (D. Ore. 1972).
51 Id. at 93417.
53 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
54
 Plaintiffs alleged violations of §§ 5, 12, and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77e (selling securities without an effective registration statement), 771 (selling securities by
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federal district court held that there was no substantial possibility
that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits; having denied plaintiffs
the opportunity to proceed in a class action, the court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 55
 The court found that
there was no credible evidence that the defendants had been pes-
simistic about the company's prospects during the period in ques-
tion, even though some of them had sold Monsanto shares. 56 Deal-
ing with the question of whether the public forecasts made by
Monsanto and some of its officers had been false or misleading, the
court noted that "to a substantial extent these projections were
fulfilled." 57 As for the projections that were not achieved, the court
said:
Monsanto's reporting to its stockholders, to the public
and to the financial community was a fair and accurate
reflection of the facts and the best estimates available to
the Monsanto management. Moreover, Monsanto timely
reported events which materially affected Monsanto's es-
timates and prospects and indicated the changes in
Monsanto's estimates and prospects that could be
ex pec ted. 58
The court concluded that the public statements "were not false or
misleading and were not devices to inflate or manipulate, and did
not inflate or manipulate the market price of Monsanto stock."59
The court in Dolgow clearly applied a negligence standard, based on
the "reasonable businessman," and seemingly was very tolerant of
missed forecasts caused by external events that were unforseeable.
This sketchy case law suggests that businessmen need not
greatly fear any increased liability under Rule 10b-5 for their fore-
casts, since even those courts that apply the broadest version of the
Rule will evaluate the unfulfilled forecast upon its reasonableness at
the time made. However, the recent case of Beecher v. Able, 6°
which resulted in a finding of liability under section 11 for an
erroneous forecast made by a large and sophisticated company, may
means of a misleading or false prospectus) and 77q (using a scheme to defraud in the sale of
securities), as well as §§ 9, 10(b), 16, 18 and 29 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
§§ 78i (manipulating securities prices), 78j (using manipulative and deceptive devices
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities), 78p (directors and officers must file
monthly report indicating any change in their holdings in their own companies), 78r (liability
for misleading statements), and 78cc (invalidity of any contract made in violation of any
provision in this chapter), and of Rules 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) (manipulative
and deceptive devices in the purchase and or sale of securities) and 16a-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-1 (1973) (filing of statements by officers, directors and principal shareholders), and
of unspecified sections of the Rules of the New York Stock Exchange.
55 53 F.R.D. at 691.
59 Id. at 670.
57
 Id. at 677.
58
 Id. at 679.
59 Id.
6° 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.NN, 1974).
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suggest otherwise. The opinion is also significant because the court
sets up guidelines for companies that issue forecasts. 6 I
Beecher arose under section 11 of the 1933 Act, 62 which pro-
vides that a company is liable to persons who buy a new issue of
securities and lose money on it because of a "false" or "misleading"
statement contained in the registration statement. The company's
liability is absolute whether the offending statement resulted from
design or inadvertence. 63
The suit in Beecher resulted from the 1966 sale of a $75 million
issue of convertible- subordinated debentures by Douglas Aircraft
Company. By the end of that fiscal year, Douglas had suffered
severe financial setbacks that considerably reduced the value of the
debentures. A class-action suit was filed on behalf of the purchasers,
alleging that Douglas had made false and misleading statements in
the registration statement filed with the Securities Exchange Com-
mission in connection with the issue. Plaintiffs argued that three
items in the registration statement were false or misleading: (1) a
statement concerning the use to which the proceeds would be put;
(2) the inclusion of an after-tax loss rather than the corresponding
pre-tax figure; and (3) a forecast that "it is very likely that net
income, if any, for fiscal 1966 will be nominal."64 Plaintiffs argued
that the third statement was false and misleading because the com-
pany proceeded to lose $52 million by the end of the fiscal year.
After a trial limited to the issue of whether the registration state-
ment contained false or misleading statements," U.S. District Judge
Constance Baker Motley held that each of the three statements
challenged was false and misleading. 66
In 1966, Douglas Aircraft Company was a large aerospace
concern manufacturing military and civilian aircraft and participat-
ing in the government's space program. 67 Douglas had an elaborate
61 See text at note 67 infra.
62 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
" Id.
64 374 F. Supp. at 345.
65 The district court directed that the trial would- be bifurcated. The first part was
limited to the question of whether there was liability stemming from the prospectus, and the
second was to be directed to the question of damages. 374 F. Supp. at 344.
66 Id. at 346. The court found that although Douglas said in its registration statement
that "a portion" of the net proceeds from the debenture issue would be used to pay off
short-term bank borrowings and that "the balance" would be used to finance the build-up of
inventories, in fact Douglas intended to use, and did use, "substantially all" of the proceeds to
eliminate current liabilities. Id. at 355. The court also found Douglas liable for failing to
include in its prospectus a pre-tax loss of $7,517,000 for the second quarter of 1966. Id. at
357. The company did include a statement that there had been a net loss of $3,463,000 but the
court found that it would have been difficult for the ordinary investor to figure out the size of
the pre-tax loss," and the omitted fact was material, since "a reasonable bond investor would
have considered the fact important in the making of his decision whether to invest." Id. The
court reasoned that the post-tax loss takes advantage of prior tax events which have given the
corporation a tax credit, so that "pre-tax loss more accurately reflects the current financial
health of the corporation." Id.
67 This statement of facts was culled from the Beecher opinion; from the opinion in
Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973) (a
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internal system to prepare income projections, and in the years 1961
to 1965, the company's forecasts had been reasonably accurate.
However, problems arose in the spring of 1966. Conditions in the
aerospace industry had become increasingly unsettled because the
Vietnam war had produced acute shortages of manpower and essen-
tial parts. In addition, some suppliers were failing to meet their
commitments to Douglas. On June 1 Douglas' directors approved
the issuance of a new issue of debentures. A registration statement
and preliminary prospectus was prepared and filed by June 7. In
mid June, Douglas' management received the alarming news that
the Aircraft Division of the company had lost several million dollars
during the month of May. A team of 50 to 70 engineering, estimat-
ing and accounting specialists was assigned to investigate the Air-
craft Division, and it was determined that inventory writedowns
and other factors would reduce the expected six-month earnings
figures. A press release was issued on June 24 describing the situa-
tion, and the registration statement and prospectus were amended.
The amendment described some of the difficulties and concluded
with the fateful statement: "Therefore, it is very likely that net
income, if any, for fiscal 1966 will be nominal." By the end of the
fiscal year Douglas had sustained a net loss of $52 million, resulting
largely from a $77 million pre-tax loss sustained by the Aircraft
Division.
The district court held that the statement quoted above
amounted to a prediction that the company would break even. 68
The court, noting that forecasting is an "art" and "largely a matter
of judgment,"69 concluded that predictions are not actionable
merely because things do not turn out as ex pected. 79 However,
reasoning that investors are likely to attach great importance to
forecasts made by management, the court said: "Therefore, in view
of the policy of the federal securities laws of promoting full and fair
disclosure, a high standard of care must be imposed on those who,
although not required to do so, nevertheless make projections."'"
The court then set out these requirements for earnings projec-
tions:
[A]n earnings forecast must be based on facts from which a
reasonably prudent investor would conclude that it was
highly probable that the forecast would be realized.
Moreover, any assumptions underlying the projection must
be disclosed if their validity is sufficiently in doubt that a
reasonably prudent investor, if he knew of the underlying
related case stemming from the same set of facts) and from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (1968), reprinted in 11967-69
Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 77,629, at 83347.
" 374 F. Supp. at 347.
" Id. at 348.
7° Id.
71 Id. (emphasis added).
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assumptions, might be deterred from crediting the forecast.
Disclosure of such underlying assumptions is ". .. neces-
sary to make . . . [the forecast] . . . not misleading . . ."
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
Factors bearing on the reasonableness of a forecast
would include the corporation's record of success in fore-
casting earnings, the care exercised in the preparation and
review of cost and sales estimates, doubts expressed by
persons engaged in the process of review, the reasonable-
ness of the underlying assumptions, and any facts not
known to management which were accessible in the exer-
cise of reasonable care. 72
After announcing these standards for the evaluation of forecasts, the
court concluded that the statement concerning future income was
"false" because "it was not highly probable that the company would
break even" and the statement was "misleading" in that "it omitted
to state facts necessary to make that prediction not misleading." 73
Essentially, the court held Douglas liable because it found that
a reasonably prudent bond purchaser would not have concluded,
from the facts available to Douglas management at the time the
prospectus was issued, that it was highly probable that the forecast
would be realized, and that substantial losses would be avoided,
even though the court also found that Douglas' management had
some basis for concluding that it would not have substantial losses
for fiscal 1966. 74 The facts that the court found material were these:
all previous forecasts for fiscal 1966 had failed; a substantial and
unforseen loss had occurred in the second quarter; and these un-
pleasant surprises were the result of management's inability to pre-
dict the level of efficiency attained by its aircraft manufacturing
division.'" These occurrences "should have put 'management on
notice that forecasts were risky, and that, unless the conditions
which produced the second quarter results . . were actually cor-
rected, results during the remainder of 1966 might be equally
disappointing. "76
The court also found that the company unreasonably expected
that its cost estimates for its Canadian subsidiary would not be
greater than originally anticipated, in light of the fact that the cost
estimates of the subsidiary were at variance with those of the
Aircraft Division. 77 Additionally, the court noted that in predicting
a break-even situation in 1966, the company forecasters relied upon
a substantial and sustained improvement in the performance of the
Aircraft Division:
72 Id. (citations omitted).
73
 Id. at 346.
74
 Id. at 348-50.
75
 Id.
16
 Id. at 350.
77
 Id. at 351.
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While the court has found that defendant might reasonably
have given some weight to the steps it had taken to correct
its problems, the prospects of making improvements
sufficient to avoid substantial losses were far too uncertain
to warrant a forecast which included the suggestion that
Douglas would have no substantial losses in fiscal 1966. 78
Supporting its conclusion, the court cited statements made by Doug-
las officers during the period indicating their uncertainty as to
whether the forecasts could be achieved and containing their admis-
sions that the forecasts contained some degree of optimism. 79 In
light of these facts, the court held that the forecast was "false." 8 °
Finally, the court concluded that, in order to keep the forecast
from being misleading, the company should have disclosed that
prior forecasts for fiscal 1966 had failed, and in addition, that the
prediction was based upon the assumption that conditions in the
Aircraft Division required improvement if the company reasonably
could expect to avoid substantial losses.'"
Since it appears that the court in Beecher imposed a standard
higher than that of due care on the grounds that the prediction was
gratuitous82 the decision seems questionable. Douglas included the
statement as a warning specifically aimed at avoiding liability,
rather than as a rosy prediction of the future. Additionally, the
policy of the securities law of encouraging public dissemination of
important corporate information would seem to militate against
imposing an extremely high standard on projections. Under the
analysis advanced in this article, Douglas' prediction would have
been found to be "false," if, as the court suggests, a reasonable man
would not haVe made such a forecast in that situation. 83
78
 Id. at 352.
79 Id. at 353. In a July 8 report to the board of directors, Douglas president Donald W.
Douglas, Jr. noted that there was "a fair possibility of an even greater loss." Id. In late June a
vice president had reported "it should be kept in mind that ... estimates contain a degree of
optimism in that they assume a recovery from present levels of the cost." Id. A report
prepared late in July by an operations official stated that the Aircraft Division's second-
quarter predictions were "ambitious in the face of the actual trends occurring at the time of
the forecasts for both assembly cost and schedule" and added that accomplishing the forecasts
would be "a difficult task." Id.
83 Id. at 354.
8 ' Id.
B2 See text at note 71 supra.
83 There is some evidence to suggest that the court would have found liability under an
ordinary negligence standard. A Fortune magazine article written at the time of the Douglas
debacle reported: "Douglas' executives confessed that there had been a serious breakdown in
corporate communication and controls. . .. The executives admitted that they had not seen so
much trouble coming. Like the public at large, they were caught completely unprepared for
it." Douglas Aircraft's Stormy Flightpath, Fortune, Dec. 1966, at 166-67. Business Week
reached a similar conclusion: "The lack of adequate information and control systems showed
itself with appalling clarity this spring when Douglas hastily had to amend a prospectus issued
for the sale of $75-million in convertible debentures. The first version had made no mention of
a second-quarter loss." Why Douglas is in a Downdraft, Bus. Week, Oct. 23, 1966, at 176.
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If the standard of high probability of realization, rather than
reasonableness, is applied to all forecasts, it is doubtful that many
will be made." Furthermore, if forecasts were required to be made
public, such a standard would result in forecasts too conservative to
be much help to investors. The Beecher decision should be limited
to its special facts, that is, to cases where a projection is made in a
registration statement or prospectus.
It is submitted that the Beecher court's requirement that ques-
tionable assumptions should be included may not be realistic. There
is at least some question whether a statement such as "This forecast
is based on our expectation that the efficiency problems in the
Aircraft Division have been turned around and steady improvement
will occur," would have made the forecast in the Douglas case less
"misleading." It can be seen that this assumption is in turn based on
others, that the chain could go still farther back, and that, in the
end, an element of "art" remains. If a forecast is based on dubious
assumptions it should not be made; if it is based on reasonable ones,
then there is no need to include them. Disclosure of any facts whose
absence makes the statement as a whole misleading is always
required." Perhaps the best interpretation of the Beecher decision is
that omission of certain material facts--the failure of prior earnings
forecasts, the unsuspected loss in the second quarter, and the inabil-
ity to predict the efficiency of the aircraft division—rendered the
registration statement misleading, and that these would have been
held to be material omissions regardless of whether a "forecast" had
been included in the prospectus.
IV. CONCLUSION
The best method of evaluating forecasts under the securities
laws is to consider them "false" when they are not believed by the
forecaster; or when they are honestly promulgated but negligently
prepared. Requiring that underlying assumptions be stated does not
seem to be of much value to make a misleading forecast any less
misleading. If underlying facts cast enough doubt on the prediction
to make it unreasonable, then it is "false" and should not be made.
As for the question whether forecasts should be permitted or
required in SEC filings, the answer depends on the answers not only
to philosophical questions concerning the purpose of disclosure, such
as: to whom should disclosure be addressed; but also to practical
questions as well, such as: where do the "average investors" get
their information?
In the event that predictions do become a more common aspect
84 "[A]ny SEC rules involving forecasts should assure forecasters that liability will not
attach to non-negligent errors in judgment or mistakes in evaluating material assembled for
the forecast. A standard stricter than this would make forecasts unthinkably perilous." Gillis,
Legal Aspects of Corporate Forecasts, Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 72, 76.
as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 78j(b) (1970).
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of disclosure, it seems clear that under a negligence standard, the
fear of liability should not be too great. Businessmen operate under
a negligence standard in other areas of disclosure, with the circuit
courts differing on whether a merely negligent statement will sup-
port an action for damages under Rule 10b-5. 86 Its application to
forecasts should give no cause for alarm, as long as it is recognized
that even the best forecasts sometimes do not come true.
HARRY H. WISE III
86 See note 48 supra.
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